The Effects of a Shorter Criminal Procedure on Crime Rates

Authors

  • Narges Khoshalhan Naragh Branch, Islamic Azad University
  • Rouhollah Sepehri Naragh Branch, Islamic Azad University

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.24200/jsshr.vol5iss03pp64-76

Abstract

A shorter and simpler criminal procedure may aspect crime rates by increasing the perceived severity of punishment and by inducing a reallocation of police enforcement resources. Methodology: I investigate the impacts of a criminal procedure reform in the Iran that allowed certain less serious effect to be prosecuted via a simplified (fast-track) procedure. The share of cases actually prosecuted via the fast-track procedure varied substantially across police districts and openness, which provides the basis for the identification strategy. The shorter procedure had very deferent effects on ordinary crimes reported by the victims and on crimes that are identified mostly by the enforcement effort of the police. Results: Specifically, it led to a substantial increase in the number of recorded criminal offenses associated with driving. This finding is best rationalized by a reallocation of police enforcement effort towards crimes that have low enforcement costs. Conclusion: I also find some but rather weak evidence of a deterrent effect on burglary and embezzlement.

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Published

2019-08-16

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