Wittgenstein’s fideism in opponents and follower's view

Abstract

The term “Wittgenstein fideism” belong to Nielsen, who attributed a position to pupils or followers of Wittgenstein and later to Wittgenstein himself. Methodology: “Wittgenstein fideism” have, more than anyone else religion current, stressed the relativity of beliefs and their relation to the forms of life in which they originate. Results: Thus; religious belief is neither rational nor irrational absolutely and logically; but they have unique trait because of their relevancies to special to language - games and form of life. Wittgenstein's fideism believes the logical discourse is sui generis and therefore cannot be understood and judged in terms other than its own. The present study will aim to investigate this claimant using by few opponents and followers view. Conclusion: The limit of Wittgensteinian fideism, which is ultimately a form of religious relativism, is that it cannot hope to be universally valid. It applies only, if at all, to that specific form of life, which is the religiosity of Wittgensteinians.